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Introduction
Figure 1 plots output and investment over the US business cycle. The gure shows that aggregate investment is strongly procyclical, very persistent and much more volatile than output. Underlying such smooth aggregate investment dynamics, however, are infrequent and large, or lumpy, capital adjustments at the microeconomic level. Doms and Dunne (1998) show that about 50 % of an average plant's cumulative investment in a 15-year period is concentrated over a period of two to three (contiguous) years. The volatility of investment is a prime contributor to aggregate uctuations. According to Barro (1997 , Table 9 .1), private investment accounts for about 93 % of the uctuations in GDP, and thus as a rst approximation, explaining recessions amounts to explaining the sharp contractions in the private investment components. 1 Notwithstanding the importance of investment in explaining the business cycle (as well as, obviously, in determining long-term economic growth), capital accumulation has been somewhat ignored in canonical versions of the New Keynesian model (see e.g. Gali, 2008) . However, standard dynamic 1 Barro's ndings are derived from an analysis of the role of investment during ve US recessions (namely, those ending in 1961Q1, 1970Q4, 1975Q1, 1982Q4 and 1991Q4). stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models do now feature endogenous capital accumulation (see e.g. Levin et al., 2005 and Wouters, 2007) .
Nevertheless, the development of a sound micro-founded model which is able to explain aggregate investment dynamics has been keeping economists busy for years. Standard DSGE models introduce convex investment adjustment costs to reproduce smooth aggregate investment dynamics. In doing so, however, the lumpy nature of plant-level investment is simply brushed away and the micro-foundations of these models for investment behaviour therefore seem rather weak. Some researchers (see e.g. Caballero, 1999) try to reconcile this apparent inconsistency by suggesting that such smooth aggregate dynamics may result from the aggregation of asynchronous and lumpy micro-level capital adjustments, which can be easily generated by non-convex (i.e. xed) adjustment costs. In fact, recent micro-founded lumpy investment models (see e.g. Khan and Thomas, 2008) provide a good description of aggregate investment.
An important debate running through recent general equilibrium literature is that on the question as to whether micro-level lumpy capital adjustments have important implications for business cycle dynamics. The origin of the debate concerning the (ir)relevance of lumpy investment for aggregate dynamics dates back to Thomas (2002) . Previously, partial equilibrium state-dependent lumpy investment models (Caballero et al., 1995 , Doms and Dunne, 1998 , Caballero and Engel, 1999 , Cooper et al., 1999 and Doyle and Whited, 2001 had stressed important amplication and propagatory eects arising from infrequent plant-level investment activities. Thomas (2002) reassessed the impact of lumpy micro-level investment in a general equilibrium framework and concluded that rm-level investment lumpiness does not play an important role for aggregate dynamics. In fact, her lumpy investment model generates business cycle dynamics that are similar to those generated by an otherwise identical model characterised by frictionless investment. According to Thomas (2002, page 508) , the irrelevance result arises from the fact that in general equilibrium, households' preference for relatively smooth consumption proles osets changes in aggregate investment demand implied by the introduction of lumpy plant-level investment. Subsequently Gourio and Kashyap (2007) , among others, contested Thomas' ndings, claiming that lumpy investment is relevant for aggregate uctuations. In fact, they recalibrated Thomas' model and found that the recalibrated model has properties that dier from those of the standard real business cycle model. This result led them to conclude that the irrelevance result does not stem solely from general equilibrium eects, but is also dependent on the calibration of the model. Currently, there are a number of other studies that support either the relevance or the irrelevance result. 2 2 Papers supporting the relevance result include Bayer (2006) , Sveen and Weinke (2007) , Iacoviello and Pavan (2007) , Bachmann et al. (2010) and Fiori (2011) . Thomas (2003, 2008) and House (2008) in turn provide additional evidence in favour of the irrelevance result. A similar irrelevance result has been obtained by Veracierto (2002) , who analyses the role of plant-level irreversibilities in investment for 3 Against this background, this paper evaluates the aggregate signicance of lumpy investment in a sticky information DSGE framework. In a related paper, Verona (2011a) , I demonstrate that time-dependent lumpy capital adjustments arise naturally when a rm faces costs of gathering and processing information. I rst show that inattentiveness is the optimal response to such information costs: the rm chooses to update its information and plans only sporadically on optimally chosen dates, and to be inattentive to new information in between adjustment dates. In particular, the rm undertakes small maintenance investment (to compensate for depreciation) when acting inattentively, whereas the stock of capital jumps to its optimal level when the rm updates its information. It is therefore likely to observe large adjustments at those planning dates. I then nd that such a partial equilibrium model is successful in tting quantitative facts on plant-level investment rates.
In this paper, I embed that theoretical framework into the sticky information general equilibrium (SIGE) model developed by Reis (2006, 2007) . Specically, I augment the SIGE model with a set of rms that make capital investment decisions in an inattentive manner. In the capital-augmented version of the SIGE model, inattentiveness is the only source of stickiness and it is pervasive to all decisions: consumption, wages, prices and capital investment decisions are all based, to a certain degree, on outdated information. This paper consequently provides two main contributions.
First, incorporating lumpy investment, which is consistently micro-founded on inattentiveness in capital investment decisions, into the SIGE model reconciles general equilibrium modelling with recent developments in the microeconomic theory of investment. Such a model allows a further contribution to be made to the debate on the (ir)relevance of lumpy investment for macroeconomic dynamics.
Second, enhancing the SIGE model by means of capital and investment overcomes one of its weaknesses, which was pointed out by Reis (2009b) . Such an improvement narrows the gap between the sticky information DSGE approach and the workhorse sticky prices DSGE framework (e.g. Wouters, 2003 and Christiano et al., 2005) , which has included capital and investment from the beginning. I therefore provide a fully edged micro-founded DSGE model that relies on just one rigidity inattentiveness to mimic the inertia found in macroeconomic data, rather than on a large set of nominal and real rigidities as put forth by the sticky prices approach, e.g. staggered price and wage setting with partial indexation, habit persistence in consumption, investment (or capital) adjustment costs and variable capital utilization. Using the model, it is therefore possible to analyse how and to what extent inattentiveness alone shapes business cycle dynamics. 3 Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2011) develop a DSGE model with rational inattention (by households and rms) à la Sims (2003) .
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the capital-augmented sticky information general equilibrium (SIGEK) model, and Section 3 presents the key log-linearised equations. Section 4 analyses the business cycle implications of lumpy investment in general equilibrium and discusses the ndings in the context of the previous literature. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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The capital-augmented sticky information general equilibrium model and make optimal decisions only sporadically. In particular, consumers choose a plan for current and future consumption, and workers choose a plan for current and future wages.
Finally, monetary and scal policies follow exogenous rules and close the model. I will begin this section by describing the market clearing conditions and policy processes and then dene the agents' problems. 
where 1 − 1/G t is the fraction of output consumed by the government, and C t =´1 0 C t,j dj and IN V t =´1 0 IN V t,f df represent total consumption of consumers and total investment of nal-goods rms, respectively. Government consumption G t is nanced by lump-sum taxes to households that keep the budget balanced at all times. The fraction G t is stochastic, and shocks to it can be interpreted as aggregate demand shocks. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate i t according to:
where P t denotes the price level, Π t+1 the real interest rate between t and t + 1, and ε t a discretionary monetary policy shock. There is a labour market for each variety of labour k. Intermediate-goods rms i demand labour, which is supplied by the household k, which has the monopoly over its labour services. Market clearing requires:
where L t,k is the total labour supply of variety k at time t, and N t,i (k) is the labour demand by the intermediate-goods rm i of variety k at time t. Total output and labour are dened by aggregating across all varieties: (i) at price P t,i , and combines them into a nal input Y t,f according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator with time-varying stochastic elasticity of substitution v t . Each department solves the following problem, with current prices and a total desired amount of inputs Y t,f being taken as given:
. 5 The problem solved by these agents is equivalent to the problem of nal-goods rms in standard DSGE models (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003) .
7
Optimal behaviour implies that the demand for each variety
is the aggregate price index. Integrating over the continuum of departments f and using the market clearing condition (3) gives the total demand for the intermediate-goods of variety i:
Inattentive producing departments
The nal good is the composite of two inputs, a homogeneous input Y t , resulting from a 
where α < 1 represents the share of capital in the rm's production function and Z t an aggregate productivity shock. The timing in (6) implies that capital becomes productive with a one-period delay. As in Verona (2011a) , I assume that the rm can buy or sell capital instantly and without any adjustment costs, at a constant price normalised to one. When the price of capital is constant, the Jorgensonian user cost of capital (i.e. the opportunity cost of holding one unit of capital for a period) is simply the sum of the discount rate of the rm and the depreciation rate.
Let me consider the problem faced by the producing department that last updated its information τ periods ago. Following the SIGE tradition, I assume that, in each period, a fraction η of departments, randomly drawn from the population, update their information, so there are η (1 − η) τ departments in this situation. 6 Each of these departments chooses the stock of capital K t,τ to maximise expected real prots:
where ρ is the real depreciation rate and (Π t + ρ) represents the user cost of capital. The 6 Bernoulli's method for modelling investment lumpiness was originally proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) .
If the rm observed all variables, this condition would state that the rm accumulates capital up to the point where the marginal product of capital equals the user cost of capital. After some rearrangements, the desired stock of capital becomes
To attain the stock K t,τ in period t + 1, the rm demands the quantity IN V t,τ of the nal good in period t given by Each of the intermediate-goods rms has a department that hires a continuum of labour varieties in the amount N t,i (k) at price W t,k . Labour services are combined into the labour input N t,i according to a Dixit-Stiglitz function with time-varying stochastic elasticity of substitutionγ t . The hiring department of the i-th rm solves the following problem, with current wages and a total desired amount of inputs N t,i being taken as given:
is the aggregate wage index. Summing over all rms i and using the market clearing condition (4) gives the total demand for labour of variety k:
where N t ≡´1 0 N t,i di.
7 This agent is equivalent to the employment agency typically introduced in the DSGE literature (see e.g. Erceg et al., 2000) . 9
Inattentive pricing departments
Let me now consider the problem faced by the pricing department of an intermediate-good
rm that last updated its information τ periods ago. In each period, a randomly drawn fraction of departments λ update their information, so there are λ (1 − λ) τ departments in this situation. They choose a nominal price P t,τ to maximise expected real prots:
Equation (10) is the production function, where β measures the degree of returns to scale and productivity A t is stochastic. The second constraint is the total demand for the rm's product in (5). The rst order condition is:
If the rm observed all the variables on the right-hand side, this condition would state that the nominal price charged is a mark-up,v t / (v t − 1), over nominal marginal costs, which correspond to the cost of an extra unit of labour, W t , divided by its marginal product,
Households
Households live forever and discount future utility by a factor ξ ∈ (0, 1). They obtain utility in each period from consumption and leisure according to:
j is consumption by consumer j at date t, L t,k is the labour supplied by worker k on date t, ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply and χ captures relative preferences for consumption versus leisure.
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On each date t, the household faces the following budget constraint:
where A t denotes the real wealth at the beginning of period t and T t are lump-sum transfers.
These transfers comprise the prots received from intermediate-goods rms, lump-sum taxes paid to the government and payments for an insurance contract that households sign at the beginning of each period so that they begin each period with the same wealth.
In the savings market, consumers face a probability δ of revising their plans every period, which means that in each period there are δ (1 − δ) τ of consumers in this situation. They choose a plan for current and future consumption,
is the time-t expenditure of a consumer who last updated her information τ periods ago. The optimality conditions for consumers are: In the labour market, a randomly drawn fraction of workers ω update their plans each period, so that in each period there are ω (1 − ω) τ of workers in this situation. They choose a plan for current and future wages, {W t+τ,τ } ∞ τ =0 , where W t,τ is the time-t wage set by a worker who last updated her information τ periods ago. The optimality conditions for workers are:γ
and 
The three determinants of the stock of capital (k t ) are split into the three terms on the righthand side. First, higher expected future output (y F IN t+1 ) increases the current stock of capital.
Second, the higher the current level of capital stock, the lower the capital stock accumulated today because of decreasing return to scale in production (α < 1). Third, the lower the real interest rate (r t ), the lower the opportunity cost of holding capital and, therefore, the higher the incentive to increase the stock of capital. If many rms are informed (η is high),
capital is instantly responsive to changes in these determinants, whereas, otherwise, capital adjusts gradually over time.
Aggregate investment (inv t ) is:
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The Phillips curve is:
This equation notes that the price level (p t ) depends on past expectations of its current value, real marginal costs and the desired mark-up. Real marginal costs are higher with (i) higher real wages paid to workers (w t − p t ), (ii) higher output (y t ), because of decreasing returns to scale (β < 1), and (iii) lower productivity (a t ). The desired mark-up increases whenever the elasticity of substitution across the goods varieties (v t ) decreases. The higher the value of λ, the greater the number of informed price-setting rms that respond immediately to shocks.
The IS curve is:
is the long real interest rate. Higher expected future wealth encourages current consumption, while higher expected interest rates encourage savings and therefore postpone consumption.
Unexpected shocks to any of these variables only raise current consumption by δ because only this fraction of consumers is aware of the news.
The wage curve is:
Current wages (w t ) are higher: (i) the higher the price level is, since workers care about real wages, (ii) the higher real wages are in the economy as these push up the demand for a particular labour variety through substitution, (iii) with higher employment (l t ), because of an increasing marginal disutility of working, (iv) with higher wealth, because of the income eect, (v) with lower interest rates, since the return on savings is lower and the incentive to work in order to save is also lower, and (vi) the lower the elasticity of substitution across labour varieties (γ t ) is, since the desired mark-up of workers is then higher. As ω increases, many workers are informed, so wages become more responsive to changes in these determinants.
The aggregate resource constraint is
where α c = c/ (c + inv) and α i = inv/ (c + inv).
13
The policy rules are
and
Finally, intermediate output and labour are given by
respectively.
Equations (14) to (23) . Each of these shocks follows an independent AR (1) process: For the purpose of this study, I calibrate the model assuming that the length of a period corresponds to one quarter. The key parameter is that driving the degree of inattentiveness in capital decisions η, which is set to 0.1. This value lies within the empirically plausible range for the lumpiness parameter indicated by Sveen and Weinke (2007) and implies that nal-goods rms are, on average, inattentive for ten quarters. 9 The share of consumption in total output α c is assumed to be 0.85 and, accordingly, the share of investment is α i = 1 − α c = 0.15. The steady-state real depreciation rate and real interest rate, ρ and r, are set to 0.035 and 0.01, respectively, which implies a user cost of capital of 18 % per year, which is in line with the value used by Abel and Eberly (2005) . The share of capital in the nal-goods rm's production function α is assumed to be 0.33. The serial correlation and the standard deviation of the nal-goods productivity shock, ρ z and σ z , are set to 0.75 and 0.5, respectively. The values for the remaining parameters are taken from Table 2 in Reis (2009b) and have been obtained from the estimation of the SIGE model on post-1986 US data. Table 3 summarises the baseline parameterisation for the SIGEK model. 9 After analysing the micro evidence reported by Doms and Dunne (1998) , Sveen and Weinke (2007) suggest that η should take values between 0.06 and 0.12. In what follows, I rst analyse the impulse responses to the various structural shocks and then investigate the models' ability to match some second-order moments of US aggregate data. The shock makes the economy more competitive (the desired price mark-up decreases) and ination consequently falls, while output, consumption and investment increase on impact.
Impulse response functions
As for the policy shock, all variables respond quickly because the goods mark-up shock is also quite short-lived (ρ ν = 0.28).
Turning to the aggregate demand (government spending) shock, Figure 8 shows that a positive innovation to aggregate demand increases ination, output and hours worked. While increasing investment signicantly, this shock has a negative wealth eect that causes consumption to fall. Figure 9 displays the responses to a positive intermediate-goods productivity shock. By construction, this technology shock has a permanent impact on output, consumption, investment and real wages. Finally, Figure 10 displays the responses to a positive nal-goods productivity shock. Although the eect of this shock is transitory, the dynamics are qualitatively similar to those of the intermediate-goods productivity shock.
For the purpose of this study, it is worth noting that there are visible dierences between the responses of the model with frictionless investment and those of the model with lumpy investment. In particular, the main quantitative dierence is that the responses of some variables, especially those of capital and investment, are much larger when attentive nalgoods rms make their capital investment decisions every period, as they react instantly to the shocks. More specically, and in contrast to Thomas' ndings, the impulse response analysis indicates that lumpy investment may be relevant for business cycle dynamics. investment are very persistent, with a rst order serial correlation above 0.9. Investment is procyclical, with no phase shift, and is about 5 times as volatile as output.
The classical model overestimates the volatility of output and investment and underestimates their persistence. In addition, it does not perform well when it comes to tting the lead-lag relation with output. The model with frictionless investment (η = 1) does not perform much better than the classical model. Even though investment is only slightly more volatile than in the data, its persistence is almost zero at all lags. Furthermore, the contemporaneous correlation with output is close to that observed in the data, but all cross-correlations at lags other than zero are low or close to zero. Pervasive inattentiveness, however, brings the model more in line with observed data on output and investment. Output is less volatile and more persistent than in the other models. Although the model predicts that investment is only about two-and-a-half times as volatile as output, it improves promisingly as regards tting investment autocorrelations (even at high lags) and the overall shape of the crosscorrelation curve. Overall, panel A clearly shows that the lumpy investment model's implied second moments of output and investment dier signicantly from those of the model with frictionless investment and are much more consistent with the empirical evidence. Table 1 allows for analysing whether the quantitative dierences in the models' output and investment moments extend to other macroeconomic variables. It reports the second moments of consumption, hours, real wages and ination. The results still exhibit interesting quantitative dierences between the lumpy and the frictionless investment 12 All data were taken from the FRED database available through the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Panel B in
The cyclical components of each series were obtained by applying the Baxter-King bandpass lter. 13 I do not report the moments of the SIGE model since they are similar to those of the SIGEK model with lumpy investment. Note. The moments for US data (in bold) were obtained by applying the Baxter-King bandpass lter to the logarithm of the original series, with a band of models. Moreover, the model that overall best captures these moments is the model with pervasive inattentiveness (even though some moments, especially the cross-correlations of consumption and real wages with output, seem hard to replicate).
This analysis therefore conrms that the business cycle is clearly aected by investment lumpiness at the micro-level, and that pervasive stickiness improves the model's ability to replicate the overall dynamics of macroeconomic variables.
How sensitive are the second-order moments of investment to changes in the degree of information stickiness η?
The previous results were obtained by setting the degree of information stickiness η to 0.10 for nal-goods rms in line with the value suggested by Sveen and Weinke (2007) . To check for robustness, Figures 3 and 4 contrast the SIGEK model's investment moments for dierent values of the parameter η with their empirical counterparts. Let me recall that the smaller the value of η, the smaller the fraction of updating rms and the smaller the impact of the shocks on capital and investment. Therefore, as η decreases, investment should become less volatile and more persistent. Figure 4 plots the cross-correlation of investment with output at dierent leads and lags. As η increases, the model becomes better at matching the contemporaneous correlation with output, but performs worse when it comes to matching cross-correlations at lags other than zero. Small values of η (i.e. high degrees of inattentiveness) in turn improve the model's ability to t the overall lead-lag relation of investment with output.
While it is true that the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness is superior to the alternatives studied here in terms of tting the dynamic behaviour of investment, it suers from a trade-o between tting the volatility and the persistence of investment. It seems dicult to solve this trade-o by just ne-tuning one parameter, namely the degree of information stickiness η in the economy. Table 3 .
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Aggregate investment rate: partial versus general equilibrium models with lumpy investment In Verona (2011a) , I show that lumpy capital adjustments arise naturally when rms face costs of gathering and processing information. I nd that such a partial equilibrium model is successful in tting quantitative facts on plant-level investment rates. I then aggregate the behaviour of many inattentive rms in order to derive some aggregate predictions and nd that the performance at the aggregate level is not as successful as at the plant-level.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 are taken from Verona (2011a, Table 2 ) and show the serial correlation and the standard deviation of the aggregate investment rate in the data (annual values), as well as the respective moments implied by the partial equilibrium model with lumpy investment. In that model, the aggregate investment rate is less persistent and far more volatile than in the data, meaning that the model does not t well the aggregate data.
Columns 4 and 5 report the moments in the data (quarterly values) and the respective moments implied by the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness. The general equilibrium model matches these moments much better than the partial equilibrium lumpy investment model. In fact, the persistence of the aggregate investment rate increases sharply (although it still remains lower than in the data) and its excessive volatility is virtually eliminated when lumpy investment is included in general equilibrium. 14 Intuitively, aggregation helps to smoothen investment spikes, but not suciently, and general equilibrium eects move the model further in the direction of tting these moments of the aggregate investment rate. 15 14 In this paper, the distribution of inattentiveness is exponential, while in the partial equilibrium model, I consider the uniform distribution (to keep the computational burden manageable). The results of the partial equilibrium model would be qualitatively similar using the exponential distribution.
15 A similar result has been obtained by Khan and Thomas (2008) . Their state-dependent lumpy investment general equilibrium model matches the data on aggregate investment rates much better than its partial equilibrium counterpart.
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Relation to capital adjustments with non-convex adjustment costs
There are some general equilibrium studies which analyse the relevance of lumpy investment for the business cycle. All of them use models with non-convex adjustment costs, while the model presented in this paper is the rst to consider information costs as a source of investment lumpiness. Even though both models are successful in replicating the observed lumpy behaviour at the micro-level, there is an important dierence between adjustment with non-convex adjustment costs and adjustment with information costs, which in turn lead to distinct dynamics and predictions.
Whenever there are costs for collecting information and planning, but no direct costs for adjusting capital, the optimal adjustment is time-dependent, as opposed to state-dependent.
In the inattentiveness model, the stock of capital at any point between planning dates is chosen regardless of the state of the world on that date, and the date of the next adjustment does not depend on the state on that date. Information costs therefore lead to time-dependent adjustments. Information collection is costless in models with non-convex adjustment costs, so that the rm constantly observes the state of the economy and, accordingly, decides whether to adjust or to stay inactive. Non-convex adjustment costs lead to state-dependent adjustments.
Distinguishing between time and state-dependent adjustments has crucial implications for many economic questions. For instance, in state-contingent adjustment models, a monetary policy shock may cause many rms to adjust their capital stocks immediately, which therefore dampens (or osets) the real impact of the shock. Instead, monetary policy has long-lasting real eects if rms make investment decisions in a time-dependent fashion since today's news does not aect the fraction of rms that respond immediately to the shock.
With state-contingent adjustment models, Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2008) argue that general equilibrium eects i.e. consumption smoothing motive are responsible for the irrelevance result. By contrast, Gourio and Kashyap (2007) The model has also allowed for addressing how far inattentiveness alone aects business cycle dynamics. I have found that the model with pervasive inattentiveness is better at matching business cycle moments than a classical model or an otherwise identical model with frictionless investment. These ndings conrm the claim of Mankiw and Reis (2006) that pervasive information stickiness is necessary to explain business cycle dynamics in sticky information models.
Introducing lumpy investment, with a microeconomic foundation based on inattentiveness, in a sticky information general equilibrium model therefore seems to be a fruitful approach for further business cycle and monetary policy analysis. However, before using the SIGEK model for normative policy analysis and for policy advice, it would be worthwhile estimating the model since it has been calibrated using dierent sources and the calibration has not been fully optimized. The main focuses of interest would be the measures of information stickiness, in particular the one regarding the capital investment decision since few (if any) estimates are available in the literature. After estimating the model, it would be interesting to investigate how dierent these measures are from those obtained by Reis (2009a,b) , and to disentangle the role played by each informational friction in shaping business cycle dynamics. The estimated model would also allow an in-depth comparison to be undertaken with workhorse sticky prices DSGE models and with the DSGE model with rational inattention developed by Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2011) , as well as with empirical VAR evidence. I leave these tasks for future research. Table 3. 32
